Green Conditionality in Industrial Policy: Certified Energy Savings and Threshold Incentives in Italy’s Transizione 5.0
Green subsidies increasingly pay for certified numbers. When public money is allocated on an energy-saving threshold certified by a paid third party, is the firm’s response real investment, optimistic reporting, or certifier-supplied leniency?
This project studies whether the notched subsidies of Italy’s Transizione 5.0 program induce real energy-saving investment or strategic responses in certified savings. When eligibility depends on a number certified by a paid third party, the measured elasticity of savings to incentives is an equilibrium outcome of the verification market, not only a technological parameter of firms. The aim is to decompose firms’ responses to the thresholds into real re-optimization, firm-side optimistic reporting, and certifier-supplied leniency.
Status: design & data-access stage · Last updated: July 2026